European governments aim to raise labour supply, cut unemployment rates and, at the same time, maintain social cohesion. Yet, economists have always stressed the trade-off between these objectives. This paper explores whether the frontier of the equity-efficiency trade-off can be shifted outwards in the Netherlands by using an applied general equilibrium model. In particular, we consider various balanced budget reforms that shift the marginal tax burden between groups and across the extensive and intensive margins of labour supply. The reforms include in-work tax benefits, an individualisation of taxes and benefits for couples, selective tax credits for secondary earners, and flat tax proposals. The analyses reveal that shifting the tax burden either away from elastic secondary earners (who typically occupy part-time jobs in the Netherlands) or away from the extensive margin of participation have the potential to raise employment, without sacrificing equality between abilities.
Introduction
As part of the Lisbon agenda to become the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world, increasing the employment rate is a top priority for European governments. The aim is especially to better integrate particular groups in labour market, such as the low-skilled, women, elderly and social benefit recipients. To achieve this goal, countries are now restructuring their welfare states. At the same time, however, governments also want to preserve social cohesion that typically underlies the traditional European welfare states. These twin objectives ignore, however, the fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency, which is inherent in the design of tax-benefit systems. It raises the question whether reforms may be able to shift the equity-efficiency possibility frontier, i.e. achieve more employment without sacrificing equity.
This paper is an exploration of these opportunities.
Optimal tax theory provides a good starting point to locate the frontier of the equityefficiency trade off. In the seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971) , the optimal marginal tax schedule that achieves equity goals with minimal distortions in labour supply is found to depend on three factors:
(i) aversion against inequality;
(ii) pre-tax income distribution;
(iii) elasticity of labour supply.
Pre-tax inequality and inequality aversion determine the benefits from redistribution. The elasticity of labour supply and the density in the income distribution determine the distortionary impact of marginal taxes on hours worked. In particular, if elasticities are large or if the density in the distribution is high, marginal taxes are relatively distortionary in terms of aggregate labour supply. Using actual pre-tax income distributions for the United States, a uniform and positive labour supply elasticity, and different values for inequality aversion, Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) show that the optimal marginal tax structure typically features a U-shaped pattern: high at the bottom and top of the distribution and low for middle incomes. Intuitively, a negative average tax for the poor, aimed at redistribution, should be phased out with income in a range where the population density is not so high. This is at the bottom. Beyond the minimum, the optimal marginal tax should fall because it applies to the more densely populated middle groups where aggregate labour supply distortions are larger. Hence, the optimal marginal tax schedule features high marginal taxes for low income groups, which is known as the poverty trap. Indeed, the poverty trap tends to minimise the distortionary cost associated with redistribution to the poor.
The optimal-tax results provide guidance for European policy makers in designing their taxbenefit systems on the frontier of the equity-efficiency trade-off. Yet, actual policy debates on 3 tax-benefit reforms focus on more than just redistribution between ability types. For instance, redistribution also refers to differences in family incomes, the presence of children and between people with different labour-market positions. Moreover labour-market distortions may vary between intensive and extensive margins of labour supply and between males and females. This multidimensional character of the equity-efficiency trade-off in the policy debate calls for a comprehensive tool to analyse the actual design of tax-benefit systems in Europe.
This paper analyses the impact of reforms in the tax-benefit system on the income distribution and labour-market performance in different dimensions in a typical European country: the Netherlands. This country is an interesting case. First, the aversion against inequality seems larger than in the United States, which is reflected in more fiscal redistribution. Second, the pre-tax income distribution is less dispersed than in the United
States. Table 1 shows this for the 90-10 percentile ratio for gross earnings, which is much smaller in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe than in America. Third, performance differs both at the extensive and intensive margins of employment. At the extensive margin, Table 1 shows that the number of people relying on social benefits is relatively large in the Netherlands.
Yet, while the female participation rate is similar to that in the United States, here is a big difference in hours worked, i.e. at the intensive margin. In the Netherlands, 60% of all women occupy part-time jobs with less than 30 hours per week. As a result, the number of working hours per employee is the lowest in the OECD. To explore the impact of reforms in the Dutch tax-benefit system, we use an applied general equilibrium model called MIMIC. The model may best be characterised as a micro-simulation model that is embedded in a general equilibrium framework. In particular, the model is rich in household disaggregation and distinguishes households that differ in skill, cohabitation, the presence of children, part-time work, age and benefit eligibility. With the model, we demonstrate the impact of several budgetary neutral reforms in the taxbenefit structure. Thereby, we concentrate on the effects for the income distribution and the labour market. All reforms shift the marginal tax burden, either by reducing distortions at the extensive margin, or by shifting it between different intensive margins of labour supply.
MIMIC: an AGE model for the Netherlands
Our applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands is called MIMIC. It has been designed to explore the structural labour market implications of changes in the tax-benefit system (see Bovenberg et al., 2000 for a core version of MIMIC; a description of the full model and its calibration can be found in Graafland et al., 2001) . The focus in MIMIC is on labour supply, labour demand and wage formation in a imperfect labour market setting. Behavioural equations are explicitly derived from microeconomic principles such as utility maximisation and profit maximisation under the usual constraints. MIMIC employs a union bargaining framework, combined with a skill-specific model for job search and matching to describe equilibrium unemployment in terms of the structure of the tax-benefit system. MIMIC has a firm empirical basis. For instance, crucial relationships like wage formation and the production function have been estimated from time series data. A unique feature of the model is the disagregation of households and the institutional detail. It implies that the model can be used to explore the effects of detailed changes in the tax-benefit system on the income distribution and labour-market outcomes. This section discusses the structure of MIMIC in more detail to understand its key economic mechanisms.
Households
MIMIC contains a disaggregated household model aimed at adequately describing the impact of institutions on labour supply and the income distribution. Table 2 gives a quick overview of this disaggregation. We see that the model accounts for heterogeneity in various dimensions, including skill, cohabitation, the presence of children, whether household members participate or are eligible for social benefits, and age. Overall, we distinguish 40 different household types. 
Firms
Labour demand for high skilled and low skilled workers is derived from firms that maximise profits subject to a CES production technology. From the first-order conditions, we derive that labour demand depends on the relative wage costs for the respective types of labour. Based on time series estimates for the Netherlands, the substitution elasticity between high skilled and low skilled workers is set at 1.15. The substitution elasticity between capital and labour is set at 0.25. Firms operate on monopolistically competitive markets without free entry. Thus, they set prices as a mark-up over marginal production costs. This gives rise to rents in equilibrium.
Firms and workers bargain over these rents in the wage formation process.
Union bargaining
Wages are obtained from a right-to-manage model. In bargaining over wages, trade unions exploit their monopsony power to reap part of the rents earned by firms. However, by setting wages above the market clearing level, trade unions create unemployment which they value negatively. Unions thus face a trade off between high wages and low unemployment. An important specification is the fall-back position of the trade union. In our model, it depends on unemployment benefits and an untaxed informal wage, e.g. a wage in the black market or the value of household production. This specification yields a non-linear wage equation in which several institutional variables enter. The equation has been estimated using Dutch time-series data (see Graafland and Huizinga, 1999) . In linearised form and evaluated in the initial equilibrium of MIMIC, the estimated wage equation reads as follows (where only parameters are presented that are relevant for our analysis):
where W is the real producer wage and h stands for labour productivity. The positive coefficient for the replacement rate (RR) reflects more bargaining power of the union if social benefits increase. Higher benefits thus raise wage demands. The average retention rate (1-Ta) enters the wage equation because the untaxed informal wage is part of the outside option of the union.
Higher average labour taxes therefore strengthen the relative bargaining position of the union and increase wage demands. A higher marginal retention rate (1-Tm) raises wages. This is because, with a low marginal tax rate, the trade union will find it more attractive to bid for higher wages since a larger part of additional wage increases are absorbed by government in the form of taxes. The elasticity of 1.5 for the unemployment rate (U) is consistent with a coefficient of the wage curve of 0.1 at an equilibrium unemployment rate slightly above 6%, 7 which is used in the calibration of MIMIC. This is consistent with the consensus estimate from empirical studies reported by e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (2005) .
Wages for low skilled and high skilled workers are determined as a weighted average (with weights of ½) of a macro wage and a skill-specific wage. In the macro wage equation, the institutional variables, Ta, Tm and RR are computed as the averages for the respective households in MIMIC. The elasticities in (1) refer to the values in this macro wage equation. In the skill-specific wage equation, the variables reflect averages for respective groups.
In MIMIC, the wage equation (1) is non-linear so that the elasticities are not constant. In particular, the elasticity for the replacement rate rises in the unemployment rate. Intuitively, a high unemployment rate makes it more important for trade unions to care about the outside option since more union members face the fall-back income. In the calibration of MIMIC, the unemployment rate among low-skilled workers is higher than for high-skilled workers. Hence, in the skill-specific wage equation, the elasticity of the replacement for low-skilled workers is higher than that for high-skilled workers.
Search-matching
In addition to structural unemployment associated with union bargaining, MIMIC also captures frictional unemployment due to imperfect matching on the labour market. This is specified separately for low skilled and high skilled workers.
The model assumes an exogenous rate of job quits that lead to vacancy creation. At the same time, there is an exogenous rate of job lay-offs that cause unemployment. We model the steady state of a matching process between vacancies and unemployment. The more efficient job matching becomes, the lower are the search costs for employers to fill vacancies and the higher is number of vacancies posted. Thus, more efficient matching reduces the frictional rate of unemployment. Matching efficiency depends on the benefit replacement rate. In particular, the unemployed endogenously determine their search effort by trading off leisure against job search. Moreover, they endogenously determine their reservation wage when deciding about accepting a job offer or continue searching. Through both channels, a higher replacement rate reduces the efficiency of job matching and raises frictional unemployment.
Government
MIMIC models the entire Dutch tax-benefit system in 2006. The Netherlands adopts a progressive tax structure in the personal income tax with increasing marginal tax rates. These rates do not apply to capital income, which is taxed separately from labour income at a proportional rate. In 2006, tax rates on labour income range from 34% for incomes up to € 17 000, 41% for incomes between € 17 000 and € 30 000, 42% for incomes between € 30 000 and € 53 000 and 52% for incomes above € 53 000. The system also contains a general tax credit of € 2000 and a labour tax credit of € 1350. The latter features a linear phase-in range between € 8 8 000 and € 16 000. In addition, several more targeted tax credits enter the system, e.g. for families with children, two-earner couples, people with a handicap, elderly and the like. Various subsidies and welfare benefits supplement the progressive tax system. For instance, the government provides general child allowances to parents of young children and basic pensions
to the elderly. Means tested benefits are provided to prevent poverty of jobless people, while means-tested subsidies are available for housing costs and health care insurance.
Analysing reforms in the tax-benefit system
The simulations with MIMIC can be seen as a comparative static analysis. All simulations are balanced-budget reforms where personal income tax rates are adjusted proportionally to maintain the public budget balanced ex-post, i.e. after the impact of behavioural responses has been taken into account. In discussing the effects of policy reforms, we concentrate on two types of variables: the income distribution and labour market performance. To summarise the effects on the income distribution, we present net disposable income ratios for different groups, e.g. high-skilled/low-skilled workers or single-earner/two-earner couples. Moreover, we present the weighted average of the marginal tax rates on workers (where weights are based on gross income) and the weighted average of replacement rates (where weights are based on employment rates). We present the effects on labour-market performance by hours worked of different groups, the participation rate of secondary earners (labelled 'female participation rate'), the unemployment rate and aggregate employment.
We explore a three reform directions. Section 4.1 starts with targeted in-work tax credits for low incomes. Section 4.2 analyzes reforms in the taxation of couples. Section 4.3 assesses the implications of flat tax proposals.
In-work tax credits
In-work tax credits have gained popularity during recent decades in a number of countries. For instance, the United States has introduced the earned income tax credit and the United Kingdom the working family tax credit. In these countries, the credits partly aim at alleviating poverty among the working poor. Yet, they also have important implications for labour-market incentives. On the one hand, the credits encourage labour-market participation of low-skilled people by raising the income gap between those inside and outside the labour market. On the other hand, they make the tax system more progressive by benefiting workers with low incomes as compared to high incomes. This hurts labour-market incentives. Several studies have explored the balance of these two effects. Using a simulation model with calibrated labour supply elasticities, MaCurdy et al. (1990) report a negative net effect on aggregate hours worked. Empirical estimates for the United States, however, suggest a positive impact on the 9 participation margin (see e.g. Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001 ), but no significant adverse effect on the intensive margin (Keane and Mofit, 1996; Meyer, 2002) . Also Blundell et al. (2000) find that the working families' tax credit in the United Kingdom raised aggregate participation on the labour market. These findings have been used by Saez (2002) who argues that an earned income tax credit with a phase-in range is part of an optimal tax system as elasticities at the extensive margin are larger than at the intensive margin.
This subsection considers the effects of in-work tax credits in the Netherlands using Other credits differ with respect to their flat and phase-out ranges. The third and fourth credits are very much targeted on low incomes: they feature no flat range and are rapidly phased out with annual incomes between € 16 000 and € 20 000 or € 24 000. The last three credits feature a flat range and a phase-out range for successively higher annual incomes. Table 3 reveals that all in-work tax credits reduce inequality. This is reflected in a reduction in the ratio of high-skilled and low-skilled labour income. The reason is that the value of a credit is fixed for all workers eligible. The higher tax rate necessary to finance the credit, in contrast, hurts higher incomes more than lower incomes. Therefore, even the fixed in-work tax credit shifts the tax burden from low to high incomes, thereby reducing inequality. Targeted credits that only apply to people collecting lower incomes reduce inequality most.
In-work tax credits reduce the replacement rate because only workers are eligible, not people that rely on social benefits. Benefit recipients actually face a decline in their income due to higher income tax rates. Hence, the income difference between people inside and outside the labour market expands.
The marginal tax burden rises for two reasons. Fist, higher tax rates are necessary to finance the in-work tax credit. Second, marginal tax rates rise in the phase-out range of the credit. In particular, an additional euro earned by people in the phase-out range will reduce the credit.
Yet, the marginal tax in the phase-in range declines. On balance, Table 3 reveals that the marginal tax burden rises for the majority of workers, especially under the targeted credits. 
Labour market effects
Labour supply in hours − 0.2 0.1 
The MIMIC simulations reveal that the unemployment rate falls by between 0.27% and 0.37%, depending on the precise design of the credit. This is dues to the lower replacement rate. It encourages the unemployed to search for work and to accept jobs, thereby improving matching efficiency and reducing frictional unemployment. Moreover, the lower replacement rate together with the higher marginal tax burden moderates wage demands by trade unions. This further reduces unemployment. The decline in unemployment is concentrated among the low skilled, especially under the more targeted credits. This is because the decline in the replacement rate is larger for this group. Moreover, reductions in the replacement rate cause larger effects for the low skilled than for other groups (see the discussion about equation (1)).
In-work tax credits also stimulate the participation of partners on the labour market. Indeed, credits reduce the average tax on jobs so that non-participating partners find it more attractive to shift into participation, usually in part-time jobs. This is reflected in the positive effect on the female participation rate in Table 3 , which rises by between 0.3% and 3.6%. Also credits that reduce the marginal burden in the phase-in range may encourage female labour supply as they reduce the marginal tax burden on small part-time jobs.
Other individuals, like primary earners and singles, reduce their hours worked. This can be explained by substitution effects induced by the increase in marginal tax burdens. It occurs either because of the increase in tax rates, or because of the phasing out of the credit. We find that labour supply of primary earners falls under each of the credits by between 0.2 and 0.8%.
Labour supply of singles falls under most credits, especially under the most targeted ones with a rapid phase-out range. The reason is that the population of singles in the Netherlands is very dense in the range between € 16 000 and € 20 000. Hence, distortions imposed by marginal tax rates in this range are large on aggregate. A more gradual phasing out of the credit and further in the income distribution mitigates the adverse labour supply effects on singles. The labour supply effect for secondary earners is the balance of positive participation effects (and hours effects for partners in the phase-in range) and negative hours effects for partners in the phaseout range. For most credit designs, secondary workers increase labour supply on net. If the credit is phased out between € 16 000 and € 32 000, however, the negative effect on hours worked is relatively large. Overall, Table 3 shows that aggregate labour supply drops in most reforms, but not all. For the credit of € 390 with a phase-in range but no phase-out, aggregate labour supply expands by 0.1%. For all other credits, labour supply falls by between 0.2% for the less targeted credits to 1.2% for the most targeted credit.
The results from Table 3 can be well-understood by the factors in the Mirlees optimal tax formula (see the introduction). In particular, it shows that, in the Netherlands, in-work tax credits are more effective to raise participation at the extensive margin of labour supply if they are more targeted on lower labour incomes. Indeed, targeting increases the effectiveness of the credit in terms of reducing unemployment and in raising the participation rate of partners in part-time jobs. However, targeted in-work credits also cause the largest disincentive for hours worked by increasing marginal tax rates in more densely populated income ranges. Hence, we face a trade-off between stimulating participation at the extensive margin and encouraging hours worked at the intensive margin of labour supply. It appears that phasing out just above the minimum wage is counterproductive to raise aggregate employment since it induces severe adverse labour supply effects on singles. Phasing out further in the income distribution seems more attractive and may help to raise aggregate employment.
Taxation of couples Individual versus joint taxation
The trade-off between equity and efficiency appears also in the tax treatment of couples, i.e.
individual versus joint taxation. Under individual taxation, each family member is taxed separately, independent of the income of other household members. Under joint taxation, the tax liability is determined by total family income. In progressive tax systems, the two principles score differently on equity and efficiency. On the one hand, joint taxation scores good in terms of equity. It takes account of economies of scale that couples achieve by living together and the implicit insurance that partners can provide to each other. Hence, family income measures ability-to-pay better than individual income. This principle is adopted as a tax unit in e.g. the United States, Germany, France, Portugal and Spain. On the other hand, individual taxation is more neutral with respect to decisions on cohabitation, i.e. it does not impose a marriage tax.
Moreover, as the labour supply of secondary earners is more elastic than the labour supply of primary earners, Ramsey principles imply that the labour income of secondary earners should be taxed at a lower rate than labour income of primary earners for efficiency reasons, see e.g. Rosen (1977) . This is what individual taxation does under a progressive tax structure.
Individual taxation is adopted in e.g. the Netherlands, Demark, Sweden, Finland, United
Kingdom, Belgium and Austria.
In the Netherlands, however, there are still elements based on joint taxation, which are leftovers from the past when the income tax was based on this principle. In particular, nonparticipating partners in single-earner couples can transfer their general tax credit of 2 000 euro to the primary earner. This reduces the tax burden on single-earner couples. If this transfer of credit would be no longer allowed, the credit of non-participating partners can only be realized if these partners collect a positive income. We have simulated with MIMIC a reform towards a completion of the individualisation of the income tax. 2 We find that the reform raises 2.5 billion euro in tax, which is used to cut income tax rates by 1%-point. The first column of Table 4 shows the simulation outcomes.
Table 4 Effects (in % changes unless indicated) of three reforms related to the taxation of couples

Individualised tax credit Secondary earner tax credit Individual basic income
Effects on distribution
Ratio single earner/ two earner − 5.5 − 2. We see that the individualisation of the general tax credit raises the tax burden on single-earner couples while reducing it on others. Accordingly, the net income ratio of single-earner couples and two-earner couples falls by 5.5%. Due to a lower marginal tax burden, singles and primary earners substitute consumption for leisure and raise labour supply. Secondary earners are more strongly affected. Table 4 shows that the female participation rate increases by 9.5% while hours worked expands by 4.8%. The reason is that the substantial increase in the after-tax income difference between one-earner and two-earner couples makes it attractive for partners to 2 In the simulation, changes in the net social minimum income level induced by this abolishment are compensated by a higher gross-up of benefits and the minimum wage.
enter the labour market. These partners primarily occupy part-time jobs. As the replacement rate remains virtually unchanged and marginal tax rates fall, there is a small upward effect on wages, which exacerbates the imperfections in the right to manage model. This raises equilibrium unemployment. Overall, we find an expansion of total employment by 1.2%.
Selective taxation of secondary earners
That secondary earners feature a higher elasticity than primary earners has also induced calls for selective taxation of partner incomes. For instance, Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) argue that an optimal income tax should differentiate marginal tax rates between spouses. The Dutch government has recently implemented elements of selective taxation by introducing a targeted tax credit for the income of secondary earners. In particular, the credit is conditional on having children under 12 years old, both partners working, and a partner income of at least € 4 500. In that case, the partner with the lowest income in the family receives a credit of € 600 per year.
We explore the implications of an extension of this policy by means of a credit that is linearly phased in between 0 and € 12 000 and that contains a maximum of € 2 700. The government budget is balanced by an increase in personal tax rates by 1%-point. Hence, the reform shifts the tax burden from the elastic group of secondary earners towards other agents in the labour market. The effects are presented in the second column of Table 4 . 3 We find that the selective credit for secondary earners raises the marginal tax burden for most workers due to the higher tax rate. This reduces hours worked by primary earners and singles. The lower tax on jobs due to the credit raises the female participation rate by 4.7%. It primarily consists of part-time jobs. Female labour supply in hours expands by 2.2%. On balance, the higher female participation rate dominates so that aggregate labour supply expands by 0.1%. The unemployment rate falls because the credit is conditional on both partners working. Hence, the credit encourages unemployed males and females to search for work and accept jobs .
An individualised basic income
While taxation is largely individualized in many countries, conditional social benefits are typically means tested on family income and/or wealth. This holds to, for instance, welfare benefits. In the Netherlands, also housing rent allowances and health insurance allowances are means tested on household income. Such benefits may be individualised as well. Perhaps the most extreme form of individualisation of benefits would be the introduction of an 3 An alternative way to relax the tax burden on elastic partners is through child care subsidies. The Corlett and Hague (1953) rule suggests that indirect taxes or subsidies may reduce the income tax distortion by either taxing goods more heavily that are complementary to leisure and household production or by subsidising goods that are relative substitutes. Child care is a typical complement to labour. Its efficiency is even higher to the extent that these subsidies are targeted to the elastic secondary earners in couples with children.
individualised basic income (see e.g. Atkinson, 1995) . 4 With its introduction, means tested benefits can be abolished altogether as the basic income provides a floor in the income distribution.
We simulate the introduction of a basic income in the Netherlands with MIMIC. In particular, we set the basic income for all individuals above the age of 18 at 50% of the social minimum income for couples. It equals € 550 euro per month and replaces existing income transfers, such as welfare benefits, basic pensions, student grants, the general tax credit and the labour tax credit. 5 To finance the basic income, we need to raise income tax rates. In particular, we replace the current progressive tax system by a flat tax of 53.5% on all income. This keeps the government budget balanced. The simulation outcomes for the individualised basic income are presented in the final column of Table 4 .
We see that the introduction of a basic income reduces the replacement rate considerably, namely by 2.6%. This is because the basic income is not means tested and, therefore, does not raise the marginal tax for low incomes. The basic income thus mitigates the problem associated with the poverty trap. Indeed, the lower replacement rate induces wage moderation, encourages job search and job acceptance and thus reduces the unemployment rate by 1.9%. The flip side of the coin is a higher marginal tax burden. Indeed, the 53.5% tax that is necessary to finance the basic income increases the marginal tax burden on average for all workers by 7.8%. This reinforces the wage moderating impact of the reform and contributes to the reduction in equilibrium unemployment. However, the higher marginal tax burden also reduces the incentives for labour supply across the board. Overall, labour supply falls by 5.3% and the female participation rate drops by 10%. On balance, aggregate employment falls by 3.8%.
Hence, whereas individualised taxation tends to support employment, individualised benefits reduce aggregate employment as they involve a substantial transfer to non-participating agents.
These results are consistent with the outcomes of Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) , who find that the optimal marginal tax rate should be high at the bottom of the income distribution.
Indeed, the removal of the poverty trap while maintaining the minimum income guarantee will exacerbate the overall distortionary impact of the tax system on labour supply. This is because it hurts labour supply among the densely populated group of middle incomes, which causes large aggregate distortions.
4 The basic income would avoid the complexities and administrative difficulties in gathering information about eligibility.
Moreover, non-compliance and moral hazard would disappear, as do the inconsistencies between different agencies responsible for supplying different benefits. A basic income also better respects privacy of individuals. These aspects are not captured in our analysis. 5 Single persons and single parents maintain supplementary welfare benefits. We reduce the level of unemployment benefits and disability benefits with the basic income. Hence, there remains only a top-up insurance for unemployment and disability.
Flat tax reforms
Flat tax reforms have considerable appeal to policy makers. For instance, the proposal of Hall and Rabushka (1983) has triggered numerous debates on flat tax reforms in the world. Their idea contains not only a single tax rate on labour income, but also a comprehensive business income tax in which investment is deductible, while capital income is untaxed at the level of the owner. Recently, a number of Eastern European countries have introduced flat income tax systems, where the focus is mainly on the single rate on labour income (see Keen et al., 2006 for a review and discussion of these reforms). Also other European countries have been discussing reforms in this direction. How does such a linear tax perform according to the optimal tax literature?
A good starting point for this analysis is Tuomala (1990) . He finds that the optimal marginal tax schedule tends to be non-linear, especially if social welfare functions feature relatively high inequality aversion and if labour supply responses are different between agents. The non-linear structure is more efficient because it is informationally superior to the linear tax. Indeed, the government employs more information on individual earnings so that it can achieve the same redistribution with less dead weight loss (see also Saez, 2001 ). Still, the optimal tax literature does not imply that a progressive system with increasing marginal tax rates is always better. For instance, if abilities are bounded above the optimal marginal tax on the highest ability agent equals zero.
We will explore how a flat income tax would perform in the Netherlands according to the MIMIC model. We simulate two versions of the flat tax that differ with respect to the change in the tax rate and the general tax credit. In the first version, the credit remains unchanged. We thus simply impose a flat tax rate of 37.5%, which is found to keep the government budget balanced. In the second flat-tax reform, we increase the general tax credit by € 1 400 and raise the flat tax rate to 43.5% to keep the government budget balanced. The extra tax credit applies only to people with a positive income and cannot be transferred by a non-participating partner to its spouse. 6 The effects of the two flat tax proposals are presented in Table 5 .
We find that the 37.5% flat tax raises inequality between skills, which is reflected in the higher ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. This is due to the rise in the tax rate in the first bracket by almost 4%. The 43.5% flat tax yields smaller effects on the income distribution as people earning low incomes are compensated by the higher tax credit. The credit benefits lower incomes relatively more than higher incomes. The middle income groups typically lose. Hence, the 43.5% flat tax redistributes the tax burden from low and high incomes towards the middle income groups. Overall, the ratio of high and low skilled labour incomes remains unchanged. Table 5 shows that the 37.5% flat tax reduces the mean of marginal tax rates on labour by 2.9%.
This increases aggregate labour supply due to substitution from leisure to consumption. Overall, labour supply expands by 1%. The increase in hours worked does not apply to all individuals.
Most primary earners and single persons face lower marginal tax rates as they are taxed at the margin in the higher tax brackets. Hence, these groups raise hours worked. Many secondary earners in couples hold part-time jobs where they are taxed at the margin in the first bracket.
The increase in the tax rate from 34% to 37.5% discourages them to work longer hours or even to occupy small part-time jobs. Accordingly, the female participation rate drops by 1.7%. As other partners increase their hours worked due to lower marginal tax rates in the higher tax brackets, the overall effect for the labour supply of partners is negligible. Overall, we conclude that the 37.5% flat tax causes more inequality but reduces distortions in labour supply. It illustrates the classical trade-off between equity and efficiency.
Under the 43.5% flat tax, labour supply distortions become larger, rather than smaller:
labour supply falls by 0.3%. The reason is that the marginal tax burden is shifted from people at the bottom and top of the income distribution towards the middle incomes. The lower tax at the bottom encourages non-working partners to participate in small part-time jobs. Hence, female participation expands by 1.5%. Moreover, high-skilled primary earners who face a lower marginal tax rate raise their hours worked. However, the higher marginal tax on middle incomes exerts negative effects on labour supply. This effect is large for two reasons. First, it raises the marginal tax for the more densely populated group, which renders the distortions larger.
Second, it raises the marginal tax primarily for secondary earners and singles who feature larger elasticities than male breadwinners. Indeed, the simulations suggest a fall in labour supply of 17 partners and singles of 0.2% and 1.2%, respectively, compared to a 0.1% rise in male breadwinner labour supply. This is consistent with Rosen (1977) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) , who argue that marginal tax rates should differ between males and females due to different elasticities. A progressive tax structure with rising marginal tax rates does this, especially in the Netherlands where a high share of females occupy part-time jobs.
Conclusions
This paper explores reforms in the Dutch tax-benefit system with the aim to shift the equityefficiency possibility frontier outwards. We find that shifting the tax burden away from elastic secondary earners may help to raise aggregate employment levels. In case of the Netherlands − which features a high share of part-time work − this may be achieved by a progressive tax rate structure, a completion of the individualisation of the income tax, and selective in-work tax credits for secondary earners. Also reforms that reduce the tax burden at the extensive margin of labour supply have the potential to raise employment. For instance, in-work tax credits may reduce involuntary unemployment and boost female labour-market participation rates. The risk of these policies is, however, that they create larger distortions at the intensive margin of labour supply which more than offset the positive participation effects. Indeed, we find that phasing out in-work tax credits just above the minimum wage tends to create severe labour-supply distortions for singles and secondary earners in couples.
The equity-efficiency trade-off may not only depend on the tax-benefit system, but also on complementary policies. For instance, next to financial work incentives, mandatory work programs backed by credible sanction policies may help to mitigate the adverse incentive effects for the unemployed to participate. In a life-cycle context, policies with respect to human capital formation or policies that replace public smoothing by individual saving accounts may help to mitigate distortions, without sacrificing equality in life-time incomes. It suggests that the search for policies to shift the locus of the equity-efficiency trade-off should be broader than just looking at the tax-benefit system in the more narrow sense.
